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Une théorie du regret et de l'information 
Résumé 
Nous proposons un modèle général de préférences qui  prend en compte la 
modélisation du regret. En confrontant les fonctions  d’utilité usuelles (fonction 
d’utilité additive et fonction d’utilité multiplicative) à ce modèle, nous en déduisons 
certaines propriétés que  ces fonctions doivent présenter pour être conformes à 
notre modèle de préférences. Par ailleurs, le regret étant intrinsèquement lié  à la 
notion d’information sur les choix qui n’ont pas été faits, nous généralisons notre 
modèle afin qu’il s’adapte à toute structure informationnelle. Nous montrons alors 
que moins la structure informationnelle est fine, plus l’utilité d’un individu, qui 
ressent du regret, est élevée.  Ce résultat veut dire qu’un individu préfère ne pas 
être exposé, ex post, à de l’information sur les choix qu’il n’a pas fait. Nous 
étudions aussi la valeur de l’information en considérant deux cas : celui de la 
flexibilité où l’information peut être utilisée par l’individu pour faire son choix et 
celui de la non-flexibilité où l’information arrive, ex post, après le choix. Nous 
montrons que la valeur de l’information est toujours négative en l’absence de 
flexibilité et qu’elle peut aussi être négative lorsqu’il y a flexibilité. 
Mots-clés : regret, information, choix en incertain, aversion au risque bivariée. 
 
A Theory of Regret and Information 
Abstract 
Following Quiguin (1994), we propose a general model of preferences that 
accounts for individuals' regret concerns. By confronting the commonly-accepted 
additive and multiplicative regret utility functions to this model, we establish 
certain characteristics that these utility functions require to be in conformity with 
our preferences model. Equally, as regret is intrinsically related to the concept of 
information about the foregone alternatives, we generalize our framework so that it 
can accomodate any information structure. We show that the less informative that 
structure is, the higher the utility of a regretful individual. This result means that 
an individual prefers not to be exposed to ex post information about the foregone 
alternatives. We also focus on information value, and consider two cases. That of 
flexibility, where information arrives before the choice and can be used to 
determine the optimal strategy; that of non-flexibility, where information arrives 
after the choice. We show that information value is negative when there is no 
flexibility, and that it can also be negative when there is flexibility. 
Keywords: regret, information, choice under uncertainty, bivariate risk aversion. 
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Most people consider that regret is the most intense of all negative emotions
and that, next to anxiety, it is the most frequent emotion according to the
empirical study of Saﬀrey, Summerville and Roese (2008). In economics, regret
is of particular interest because it has a signiﬁcant impact on the theory of
choice. As Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) observe, ‘all other negative emotions
can be experienced without choice, but regret cannot’. It is a counterfactual
emotion (Kahneman and Miller 1986), which can occur when an individual
compares the result of his choice to what he would have obtained had he made
another decision. This conterfactual and negative emotion, when anticipated,
plays a role in decision-making. In order to model regret it is necessary to move
away from the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) (VNM), since
preferences ordering depends on the entire set of alternatives. Early work by
Bell (1982 and 1983) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) dealt with pairwise choices.
Generalization has been pursued in more recent articles (Loomes and Sugden
1987 and Sugden 1993), which propose regret theories in which the choice set
contains more than two alternatives. Sugden (1993), in particular, proposes
a set of axioms implying a general regret theory. Quiguin (1994), following
Loomes and Sugden (1987) and Sudgen (1993), promotes a utility function that
depends on two payoﬀs: that of the chosen strategy and that of the ex post
best strategy. The ex post best payoﬀ is the reference payoﬀ (or reference
point) against which regret is evaluated. Quiguin shows that preferences are
not manipulable when they are represented by a utility function which satisﬁes
the Irrelevance of Statewise Dominated Alternatives property (ISDA property).
This property states that the withdrawal of a statewise dominated strategy from
the choice set does not modify the most preferred strategy. In this paper, we
use the utility function of Quiguin to develop two new research paths. The ﬁrst
2path is based on the observation that the Quiguin general utility function needs
to satisfy additional assumptions in order to be operational and to constitute
an adequate representation of regretful preferences. We thus propose a series of
properties needing, in our opinion, to be satisﬁed by a regret-utility function.
The second research path springs from the observation that regret is intrinsically
related to the idea of information as regards the alternatives. The intensity of
regret that an individual may feel depends on the information he has about the
foregone alternatives. We thus propose a general framework which allows us to
consider any information structure, and then use this framework to examine the
value accorded by regretful individuals to information.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we propose a general model of preferences which
takes into account individuals’ regret concerns. We use the Quiguin utility func-
tion to propose a uniﬁed framework in which any regret-related question can
be studied. To the best of our knowledge, this clariﬁcation work has not so far
been carried out, so that each author uses his own assumptions. We address, in
a particular, the question of modeling risk preferences when the utility function
is bivariate, since the Quiguin regret-utility function depends on the outcome
of two strategies. The question of multivariate risk aversion has already been
investigated by M. Marinacci and L. Montrucchio (2005), Eeckhoudt, Rey and
Schlesinger (2007) and A. Müller and M. Scarsini (2011). We observe that these
approaches cannot be directly applied to a regret-utility function, and show how
they need to be modiﬁed to be coherent with our framework. We use, in par-
ticular, both the supermodular function and separatively inframodular function
concepts. We also introduce reference point risk aversion (RPRA) which refers
to the concavity of the regret-utility function with respect to the ex post best
outcome. RPRA is introduced by Khrämer and Stone (2008), who consider
the decision-making of a regretful individual in a dynamic context. However,
3our deﬁnition of reference point is somewhat diﬀerent. In Khrämer and Stone,
the reference point refers to the preference valuation of a payoﬀ, whereas our
refrence point deﬁnition focuses on the payoﬀ itself. Moreover, Khrämer and
Stone’s reference point is the utility obtained from the highest ex post payoﬀ of
the unchosen strategies. Our own reference point is the highest ex post payoﬀ
of all the strategies, which means that, unlike Khrämer and Stone, we exclude
rejoicing. As Quiguin (1994) shows, rejoicing is not compatible with preferences
satisfying the ISDA property. Lastly, Khrämer and Stone consider an additive-
regret utility function, whereas our model deals with a general utility function.
Having outlined a set of properties characterizing a general regret-utility func-
tion, we analyse the usual utility functions: the additive regret-utility function
introduced by Bell (1982) and taken up by Braun and Muermann (2004), and
the multiplicative regret-utility function introduced by Quiguin (1994). We
derive a certain number of characteristics needed for the multiplicative utility
function to be in conformity with our general preferences model.
The rest of the paper starts from the observation that much of regret the-
ory is established under perfect information, where the results of the unchosen
alternatives are perfectly observable. Since perfect information is a particular
case, we propose a general framework which can acommodate any information
structure about the foregone alternatives. Bell (1983) was the ﬁrst to consider
imperfect information about the outcomes of the unchosen alternatives in a
model in which alternatives were independent. Imperfect information is also
to be found in Khrämer and Stone (2008). In our paper, we adopt Khrämer
and Stone’s modeling of information structure. The results of the unchosen
strategies are not observable for the decision maker, who can only observe the
outcome of his own strategy. The outcome, however, includes both a payoﬀ
and a signal. The individual infers a certain amount of information about the
4unchosen strategies, not only from his observation of the payoﬀ, but also from
that of the signal. This broader approach enables any information structure to
be dealt with.
We use our general framework to compare diﬀerent information structures.
We show that the expected utility of a regretful individual decreases as the
information structure becomes ﬁner, in the sense of Blackwell (1951). This result
means that an individual prefers to minimize his exposure to ex post information
about the foregone alternatives. We also assess the impact of regret on the
willingness to pay for information. Under VNM axioms, information value is
always positive with, in the worst case, the information being useless and of
no value (see Gollier 2001, for example). In this paper, however, we show that
information can be harmful when people experience regret. We consider two
cases: the non-ﬂexibility case in which information only arrives after the choice,
and that of ﬂexibility, in which information arrives before the choice and can
be used to determine the choice. We show that information value is negative
under non-ﬂexibility and can also be negative under ﬂexibility.
In the non-ﬂexibility case, obtaining information about an unchosen strategy
can lead to regret when the choice cannot be modiﬁed. People systematically
dislike obtaining information which cannot be used to modify the choice. We
show that the RPRA property is necessary to establish this result.
On the theoretical side, the idea of information harmfulness has already
been considered by Krähmer and Stone (2008), who identify diﬀerent forces
that shape the behaviour of an individual. One of these forces is a tendency
to behave conservatively. In their model, a regretful agent can be reluctant to
modify his behaviour, fearing that he might regretfully discover that he would
have been better oﬀ if he had done it before. The agent sticks to past choices,
even if there are some indications to show that switching would be payoﬀ maxi-
5mizing. Conservative behaviour, highlighted by Krähmer and Stone, underlines
the harmfulness of information. The agent is conservative because he fears in-
formation about foregone past actions. This is perfectly in line with our result
concerning the negative value of information.
On the experimental side, our result conforms with that of Zeelenberg et al.
(1996). The authors perform an experiment where they set up two risky lotteries
to which participants are indiﬀerent. Indiﬀerence as regards the two lotteries is
established when there is no feedback on the foregone lottery. Stated otherwise,
people exclusively obtain feedback on the lottery of their choice. One of the two
lotteries is relatively risky, the other relatively safe (the probability of winning
is higher but the gain is lower). Zeelenberg et al. modify the feedback context
and observe the behavioural consequences. When people know that the result
of the risky lottery will be revealed, they are no longer indiﬀerent to the two
lotteries, tending to prefer the risky one. They abandon the safe lottery because
they try to protect themselves against the regret which may arise from having
information about the foregone lottery (information about the risky lottery if
they choose the safe lottery). Zeelenberg et al. show that ‘regret aversion’
induces risk-seeking behaviour (when people anticipate feedback on the risky
lottery), or risk-avoiding behaviour (when people anticipate feedback on the safe
lottery). These types of behaviour, which consist in avoiding information about
the foregone lottery, are consistent with our result. Information about foregone
alternatives is utility decreasing. The experimental investigation of Zeelenberg
et al. can thus be interpreted as an empirical justiﬁcation of the RPRA property
needed for our result. Other experimental studies (Josephs, Larrick, Steele
and Nisbett 1992, Larrick and Boles 1995, Ritov 1996, Inman and Zeelenberg
1998, Zeelenberg and Pieters 2004, Humphrey, Mann and Starmer 2005), also
reveal the sensitivity of choices to the feedback context, and demonstrate that
6people try to protect themselves against information they could have obtained
by making a diﬀerent choice.
When there is ﬂexibility, information is used to determine the optimal choice.
At ﬁrst sight, it might be thought that information is useful per se, and could
not be harmful. However, we show that, for a regretful individual, information
value can be negative. The explanation of this result is less intuitive than in
the non-ﬂexibility case. Information aﬀects expected utility levels through two
diﬀerent channels. First, information modiﬁes probabilities: an individual who
receives information uses it to revise his beliefs about the available strategies.
Under VNM axioms, this probability revision is the only channel through which
information modiﬁes expected utility levels and choices. Let us call this channel
the probability eﬀect. But, when a regretful individual is brought into the pic-
ture, information modiﬁes expected utility levels via another channel. In this
case, information modiﬁes expected regret: good news about a given strategy
can be bad news about other strategies1. For example, a signal which indicates
good news about a particular strategy can increase the regret that an individual
anticipates feeling if he were to choose another strategy. This channel, which we
call the regret eﬀect, explains why information value can be negative when there
is ﬂexibility. In order to understand this better, let us now consider a regretful
individual who has the choice between two risky and independent alternatives,
X and Y , where X denotes his optimal strategy. Let us now assume that the
individual receives a perfect signal about Y . If the signal indicates bad news,
X remains the optimal strategy. But if the signal indicates good news, let us
consider the case where the probability eﬀect is too weak to make Y the optimal
strategy (the signal is not very good news). This means that, without the regret
eﬀect, X would remain the optimal choice. The story would come to an end,
1This is true even if the strategies are independent. At this particular point, we do not
examine the probability eﬀect.
7and the expected utility of the individual, who anticipates obtaining the signal,
would be unchanged. Now let us assume that the regret eﬀect, which decreases
the expected utility from choosing X, is strong enough to make Y the optimal
strategy, despite the weakness of the probability eﬀect. Strategy Y becomes op-
timal, not because the expected utility of Y becomes higher than the expected
utility of X, but because the expected utility of X decreases. Good news about
Y increases the regret that the individual anticipates feeling if he were to choose
strategy X. In this example, in aggregate, the expected utility of the individual,
who anticipates receiving the signal, decreases. The information value in this
case is, therefore, negative. In the body of the article we give exact conditions
under which information value is negative when there is ﬂexibility.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a model of
preferences that takes into account individuals’ regret concerns, outlining a set of
properties needed to be satisﬁed by a regret-utility function. Section 3 examines
the usual regret-utility functions in the light of Section 2 properties. Section
4 generalizes the model introduced in Section 2 to any information structure.
Section 5 is dedicated to the study of information value.
2 The model
Uncertainty is represented by a state space   = {1,...,S} and a probability
distribution (π1,...,πS) on  . Let Φ denote a set of N + 1 risky alternatives,
with a risky alternative Yn being an S-tuple of state-contingent outcomes Yn =
(yn1,...,ynS). Following Quiguin (1994), in each state, a regret-utility function
(r-utility function) depends on the payoﬀ of the chosen strategy and on the
highest realized payoﬀ (among the N + 1 risky alternatives). If we denote the
chosen strategy by X = (x1,...,xS), and the unchosen strategies by Y1...YN, the




with rs = max{xs,y1s,..,yns,.,yNs}.
Here, we exclude the feeling of rejoicing when the agent learns that he has
chosen the best strategy. Rejoicing has been investigated by G. Loomes and
R. Sugden (1982) in a two-choice model and, in a more general setting, by G.
Loomes and R. Sugden (1987) and R. Sugden (1993). Generalization to a choice
set containing any number of alternatives generates a class of utility functions
that depends on the results of all the risky alternatives: u(xs,y1s,..,yns,.,yNs).
However, Quiguin (1994) shows that, among these utility functions, the one
which satisﬁes the ISDA property takes the form u(xs,rs). With this form,
rejoicing is eliminated from preferences. In this article, we follow Quiguin (1994),
but consider that the functional form u(xs,rs) is general and cannot be directly
operational. It must satisfy some additional properties in order to constitute an
adequate representation of regretful preferences. This section is thus dedicated
to presenting a set of properties appropriate to an r-utility function. In the
rest of the article, we assume that u(xs,rs) satisﬁes these properties. This
gives us a framework within which to study how a regretful individual evaluates
information.
In order to develop our series of properties, we alleviate our notations by
omitting the reference to the state of the world s. We thus rewrite the r-utility
function as u(x,r).
Under condition r = x there is no feeling of regret, since the chosen strategy
coincides with the ex post best strategy. The level of satisfaction u(x,x) is,
thus, not aﬀected by any feeling of regret, and can be related to the ‘choiceless
utility function’ of Loomes and Sudgen (1982). The authors deﬁne this utility
9function as ‘the utility that an individual would derive from the consequence x
without having chosen it’. This utility is the satisfaction derived from payoﬀ
x, independently of the idea of choice. In what follows, we retain the same
terminology as Loomes and Sugden, calling function u(x,x) the choiceless utility
function (c-utility function). This represents the utility obtained from payoﬀ x,
unaﬀected by emotions. As we will see in this section and in Section 4, the
c-utility function plays an essential role in the deﬁnition of regret.
Let u1 (x,r) denote
∂u(x,r)
∂x and u2 (x,r) denote
∂u(x,r)
∂r . The same rule ap-
plies for the notations u11 (x,r), u22 (x,r), u12 (x,r) and so on. We begin by
introducing the properties of the c-utility function u(x,x):
P1a. The c-utility is increasing
∂u(x,x)
∂x = u1 (x,x) + u2 (x,x) ≥ 0
P1b. The c-utility is concave
∂2u(x,x)
∂x2 = u11 (x,x)+u12 (x,x)+u21 (x,x)+
u22 (x,x) ≤ 0
In order to better understand P1a and P1b, let us imagine that, out of the
set of available alternatives, there is one which gives the best payoﬀ, whatever
the state of the world. Choosing this dominant strategy ensures not having any
feeling of regret, but does not protect against the payoﬀ risk. We thus assume
that an r-individual is averse to the payoﬀ risk of a dominant strategy (P1b).
Moreover, we assume that an r-individual utility increases with a dominant
strategy payoﬀ (P1a).
As the c-utility is an increasing function under P1a, we are now able to
characterize the reference point and the feeling of regret:
Deﬁnition 1 The reference point is the ex post payoﬀ which maximises the
c-utility function.
The reference point, with respect to which regret is computed, is based
10on the c-utility function criterion. This concept will be used and generalized
throughout the paper.
Deﬁnition 2 Regret occurs as soon as the c-utility level generated by the refer-
ence point exceeds that of the chosen strategy payoﬀ.
There is regret as soon as u(x,x) is lower than u(r,r) or, under P1, as soon
as r>x.
Let us now expose the properties of the r-utility:
P2a. The r-utility increases with x u1 (x,r) ≥ 0
P2b. The r-utility decreases with r u2 (x,r) ≤ 0
Property P2b, which is necessary for regret modeling, states that the r-
utility decreases with the ex post best outcome. The payoﬀ x being given, as
the reference point increases, regret increases and utility decreases.
We now try to deﬁne the risk preferences of a regretful individual (r-individual).
Since there is no unanimously accepted deﬁnition of bivariate risk aversion, we
formulate the hypotheses best adapted to our regret-modeling objective. In or-
der to do so, we consider two possible bivariate outcomes: (x,r) and (x,r) with
x ≤ x and r ≤ r.
P3. The r-utility is supermodular
u(x,r) + u(x,r) ≥ u(x,r) + u(x,r)
Property P3, as it is formulated, can be interpreted as follows: an individual
prefers the 50-50 lottery [(x,r),(x,r)] to the 50-50 lottery [(x,r),(x,r)]. An
individual has a supermodular r-utility function if he prefers a 50-50 gamble
where he can either have a high payoﬀ with high regret, or a low payoﬀ with
11low regret, rather than the negative correlation version of this game where
payoﬀ and regret are negatively correlated2. In other words, we assume that
the risk preferences of an r-individual are characterized by positive correlation
loving. This property is akin to the deﬁnitions of correlation loving given by
Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger (2007). Although the authors do not speciﬁcally
indicate the nature of the sign they use for their correlation, it seems clear that
they call ‘correlation averse’ an individual who is a negative correlation lover3,
and ‘correlation lover’ an individual who is a positive correlation lover4. In
this paper, as our utility function decreases with its second argument, it is the
assumption of positive correlation loving which is called for.
It should also be noted that P3 can be rewritten as
u(x,r) − u(x,r) ≥ u(x,r) − u(x,r) (2)
Starting from the above equation, it is easy to demonstrate that an r-utility
function is characterized by positive correlation loving if and only if its cross
second derivatives are positive. Thus P3 can be reformulated as
P3. The r-utility is supermodular
u12 (x,r) = u21 (x,r) ≥ 0
When talking about risk preferences, we should also consider the following
property:
P4 The r-utility is separately inframodular
∀r,∀x ≤ x,∀h ≥ 0,u(x + h,r) − u(x,r) ≥ u(x + h,r) − u(x,r)
2It is easy to show that he also prefers positive correlation to the independent version of
the game in which x and r are not correlated.
3Or who is positive correlation averse.
4Or who is a negative correlation averse.
12∀x,∀r ≤ r,∀h ≥ 0,u(x,r + h) − u(x,r) ≥ u(x,r + h) − u(x,r)
This could also be expresssed in the following terms :
P4a. The r-utility exhibits payoﬀ risk aversion u11 (x,r) ≤ 0
P4b. The r-utility exhibits reference point risk aversion u22 (x,r) ≤ 0
Property P4a, unlike P4b, does not require any particular explanation.
Property P4b states that the r-utility function is concave with respect to the
reference point. That is to say, we assume that an r-individual is reference point
risk averse. We recognize that the concept of RPRA has to be investigated by
means of experimental approaches in order to be justiﬁed. However, as we will
see in Section 5.1, the results that we obtain under this assumption are in line
with the available experimental studies in psychology on regret and information.
The deﬁnition of r-individual risk aversion, founded on properties P3 and
P4, can be compared with the deﬁnition of multivariate risk aversion given by
A. Müller and M. Scarsini (2011). The authors deﬁne multivariate risk aversion
as the property of inframodularity which characterizes a function whose incre-
ments are decreasing (see also M. Marinacci and L. Montrucchio 2005). This
constitutes a generalization of the one-dimensional concavity according to which
a function has non-increasing diﬀerences 5. It can be shown that a multivariate
function is inframodular if and only if it is submodular (the reverse property of
P3) and separately inframodular. In our paper, submodularity would not be a
reasonable assumption, because the utility function decreases with regret. Thus,
unlike A. Müller and M. Scarsini, we assume supermodularity (property P3).
We also assume that the r-utility function is separately inframodular, which
leads to payoﬀ risk aversion and to RPRA.
5However, in the multi-dimensional case, inframodularity and concavity are two indepen-
dent concepts.
13To summarize, unlike A. Müller and M. Scarsini, we consider that inframod-
ularity cannot characterize multivariate risk aversion when the utility function
decreases with at least one of its arguments. We propose to characterize the
risk preferences of a regretful individual as being supermodular6 and separately
inframodular.
To the best of our knowledge, the inﬂuence of the reference point on payoﬀ
risk aversion is still an open question, and so is the payoﬀ inﬂuence on RPRA.
Nevertheless, since regret increases with the reference point, it seems reasonable
for us to assume that payoﬀ risk aversion does not decrease with the reference
point. Likewise, we assume that RPRA does not increase with payoﬀ. In
other words, we assume that the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient
−
u11(x,r)
u1(x,r) does not decrease with y, and that −
u22(x,r)
u2(x,r) does not decrease with
x.
P5a. Payoﬀ risk aversion does decrease with the reference point
u112 (x,r)u1 (x,r) − u12 (x,r)u11 (x,r) ≤ 0
P5b. Reference point risk aversion does not increase with payoﬀ
u221 (x,r)u2 (x,r) − u21 (x,r)u22 (x,r) ≥ 0
Although P5a and P5b impose certain restrictions as to the form of the r-
utility function, the multiplicative form u(x,r) = w(x)φ(r), or the following
additive form u(x,r) = w(x)+φ(r), satisfy these properties. These two forms
are special cases where x-risk aversion is independent of r, and r-risk aversion
is independent of x.
Under P2, P3 and P4, property P5a implies that u112 (x,r) ≤ 0. This
means that an r-individual is cross prudent as regards payoﬀ (see Eeckhoudt,
6See Meyer and Strulovici (2010) for an analysis of supermodularity.
14Rey and Schlesinger 2007). He prefers the 50-50 lottery (x +￿ ε,r) to the 50-50
lottery (x +￿ ε,r), where ￿ ε is a zero mean payoﬀ random variable. Similarly, the
combined set of P2, P3, P4 and P5b implies that u221 (x,r) ≥ 0, which means
that an r-individual is cross prudent in regret (reference point). Our derivatives
have the opposite sign to that of Eeckhoudt, Rey and Schlesinger for the reason
given above: the r-utility function decreases with r.
In the next section, we examine the usual regret-utility functions in the light
of P1 to P5b. However, in the other sections of the paper, it is not necessary
to have the complete set of properties to obtain our results (for example, we
never use P5a and P5b). That is why, under each proposition, we indicate the
speciﬁc properties needed to obtain the result.
3 The usual regret-utility functions
In the literature, two types of utility functions are used to model regret. The
ﬁrst, most commonly-used type, which exhibits additive regret, was introduced
by Bell (1982), and by Braun and Muermann (2004). The second type, which
exhibits multiplicative regret, was introduced by Quiguin (1994). Both types
satisfy the ISDA property.
3.1 Additive regret
In the additive form, a regret function is added to the c-utility function as
follows:
u(x,r) = v(x) − kg(v(r) − v(x)) (3)
where v′ (.) ≥ 0, v
′′
(.) ≤ 0, k > 0, g (.) ≥ 0, g′ (.) ≥ 0 and g
′′
(.) ≥ 0.
Function v(.) is the c-utility function, and function g (.) is the regret func-
tion. It is easy to verify that the additive r-utility function satisﬁes properties
15P1 to P4a. Property P4b, that is to say RPRA, is not necessarily satisﬁed. The
additive utility function accords priority to the concept of regret risk aversion
by assuming the convexity of the regret function g(.). The idea of regret risk
aversion, though more intuitive, is not necessarily more appropriate than that
of RPRA. A justiﬁcation of P4b is given in Section 5.1. It should be noted that
P5a and P5b are also not necessarily satisﬁed by the additive r-utility function.
3.2 Multiplicative regret
The multiplicative r-utility function has the following expression:
u(x,y) = w(x)φ(r) (4)
With the multiplicative form, the choice between strategy X1 and strategy
X2 is determined by the sign of
S ￿
s=1
πs [w(x1s) − w(x2s)]φ(rs). As Quiguin
(1994) observes, the eﬀect of regret is to attach diﬀerent weights to the diﬀerent
states. Moreover, Quiguin expects φ(r) to be increasing since he considers
that, in the above-mentioned expression, states with high potential for regret
should be weighted more heavily relative to their probability than states with
low potential for regret.
In the light of P1 to P5b, we determine the exact characteristics of the
functions w(x) and φ(r). In order to simplify the presentation of our results,
we rewrite the expression of u(x,r), replacing w(x) by −v(x):
u(x,r) = −v(x)φ(r) (5)
Our results are summarized in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2:
Proposition 1 The multiplicative r-utility function is negative.
16Proof. It is easy to verify that P2 and P3 are satisﬁed, either when v(x) ≥ 0
and φ(r) ≥ 0, or when v(x) ≤ 0 and φ(r) ≤ 0. In both cases, u(x,r) =
−v(x)φ(r) ≤ 0.
In what follows we assume, without loss of generality, that v(x) ≥ 0 and
φ(r) ≥ 0.
Proposition 2 The multiplicative r-utility function is characterized by: v′ (x) ≤
0, v
′′
(x) ≥ 0 and φ
′ (r) ≥ 0 and φ
′′ (r) ≥ 0.
Proof. P2 =⇒ v
′
(x) ≤ 0 and φ
′ (r) ≥ 0. P4 =⇒ φ
′′ (r) ≥ 0 and v′′ (x) ≥ 0.
Our results are consistent with the intuition of Quiguin (1994) since, given
our set of properties, we ﬁnd that function φ(r) increases. However, we note
that this result only makes sense when combined with the result of Proposition
1. When the payoﬀ level x is given, the r-utility should decrease when r increases
(because regret increases). This is eﬀectively the case when two conditions are
met: φ(r) is an increasing function, and the multiplicative r-utility is negative.
We give two examples of multiplicative r-utility functions which satisfy P1−
P5b:
Example 1 When v (x) = e−γx and φ(r) = ekr, the multiplicative r-utility
function is
u(x,r) = −e−γx+kr (6)
When γ ≥ k ≥ 0, the above r-utility function satisﬁes P1 − P5b.
Example 2 When v(x) = x−γ and φ(r) = rk, the multiplicative r-utility func-
tion is
u(x,r) = −x−γrk (7)
When γ ≥ k ≥ 1, the above r-utility function satisﬁes P1 − P5b.
174 Regret and information structures
We call decision stage the time of the choice, and learning stage the time of
uncertainty resolution. In this section, we focus on the information available at
the learning stage.
Equation (1) implicitly assumes a particular ex post information structure.
The r-individual observes not only the realization of the chosen strategy xs
but also the realizations of all the unchosen strategies: {y1s,...,yNs}. He thus
learns the best outcome rs = max{xs,y1s,...,yN−1s}, and experiences regret
when xs < rs. We refer to this information structure as the perfect information
structure because, at the learning stage, the agent has perfect information about
the ex post best outcome. It is easy to imagine many diﬀerent alternative
information structures: for example, the opposite case in which the agent learns
the result of his chosen strategy but does not observe the result of any other
strategy. In this case, at the learning stage, the agent does not know what the
best outcome is. Does that mean that he does not feel any regret? We do not
think so. Imagine that the outcome of the chosen strategy is very low. The agent
might feel regret at not having chosen another strategy. Consequently, there is
still a reference point, but it cannot be equal to rs, since it is not observable.
In order to introduce diﬀerent ex post information structures in our model,
we choose to abandon the states of the world approach. We now assume that
the payoﬀ of a risky alternative Yn is a random variable which takes its values
in the support WYn ⊂ R. The agent now chooses from N + 1 random variables
or lotteries. Throughout the rest of the paper, we denote random variables by
capital letters, and their typical realizations by small letters.
In order to deﬁne the reference point for any information structure, we need
to consider the agent’s information at the learning stage. We now assume, as
in Khrämer and Stone (2008), that a strategy’s outcome is made up of both a
18payoﬀ and the realization of a signal about the foregone alternatives. Let SX
denote the strategy X information structure (X − IS), which is characterized
by the set of signals {Sx,x ∈ WX}, with Sx denoting the signal conditional to
the realization x of strategy X. Let  Sx ⊂ Rm, with m > 0 denoting the
support of Sx. The signal Sx represents the ex post information structure if the
chosen strategy X takes the value x. At the learning stage, an unchosen risky
alternative payoﬀ Yn is thus characterized by an ex post probability distribution,
given the realization of both the signal sx and the payoﬀ x. We should also recall
at this point that the feeling of regret is based on the c-utility (see Deﬁnition
2). We thus compute the ex post certainty equivalent of each strategy payoﬀ










= E [u(yn,yn)|x,sx] (8)
where the operator E [.|x,sx] represents the mathematical expectation con-
ditional to the information at the learning stage. The certainty equivalent of
the chosen lottery is equal to the realization of the lottery
ECx,sx
x = x (9)
We are now able to give a general deﬁnition of the reference point:











Deﬁnition 3 generalizes Deﬁnition 1 given in Section 2. Regret is still deﬁned
using the c-utility function u(x,x). At the learning stage, regret occurs when the
c-utility obtained from x is lower than the highest expected c-utility which could
be obtained from the foregone strategies. In other words, regret is to be found
19when u(x,x) is lower than u(rx,sx,rx,sx) or, alternatively, when x < rx,sx. If it
turns out that x is the best payoﬀ at the learning stage (given the individual’s
information), then rx,sx = x, which means that regret is absent.
Let f (y1,...,yN|x,sx) denote the density of y1,...,yN conditional on X = x
and on Sx = sx. We now introduce a new deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4 Let S1
X and S2
X denote two diﬀerent X − IS. The second of
these, S2
X, is more informative than S1
X if















This deﬁnition states s2






. It is an adap-
tation of Blackwell’s concept of ‘garbling’ to our framework7. S2
X is more
informative than S1
X if, for some x, S1
x is obtained by garbling the messages
coming from S2
x (and if S1
x and S2
x are identical for the other values of x). In
other words, for some x, S1
x is a stochastic transformation of S2
x. As the sto-
chastic transformation is independent of y1,...,yN, information is lost through
the transformation. For some x, S2
x gives, therefore, more information than S1
x
about the foregone alternatives: S2








x, the signal realization
s2







We now deﬁne an information structure IS as a set of strategy information
structures:
IS = {SX,SY1,...,SYN}
An information structure represents the ex post informative context that
an r-individual is faced with when he makes his choice. In order to compare
diﬀerent information structures, we introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5 An information structure IS2 is X-ﬁner than an information
7See, Malueg (1980) and Gollier (2001) for a presentation of the Blackwell (1951) theorem.
20structure IS1, if S2
X is more informative than S1
X, provided all the other Yn−IS,
n = 1...N remain the same.
An information structure IS2 is ﬁner than an information structure IS1, if
∀X ∈ Φ, S2
X is more informative than S1
X.
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Let X denote the optimal strategy of an r-individual under the
information structure IS1 or under the information structure IS2. If IS2 is an
X-ﬁner information structure than IS1, the r-individual prefers IS1 to IS2.
Proof. The proof uses P1a, P1b, P2b and P4b. See Appendix 1.
According to Proposition 3, an r-individual prefers to minimize his exposure
to ex post information about the foregone alternatives. P4b, the property of
RPRA, is central to this result. As suggested by the reference point expression
given in Deﬁnition 3, the reference point ﬂuctuates with the signal and, put
simply, the ﬁner the information, the riskier the reference point.
We also obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4 If the information structure IS2 is ﬁner than IS1, any r-individual
prefers IS1 to IS2.
Proof. The proof uses P1a, P1b, P2b and P4b. See Appendix 1.
Proposition 4 states that any r-individual prefers to live in the least ex post
informative context. Under the VNM axioms, Proposition 3 and Proposition
4 would not hold. An individual would be indiﬀerent to IS1and IS2 since he
would only be concerned with his own payoﬀ strategy.
Let us now call the uninformative information structure the situation in
which all the signals are uninformative, or the situation in which a strategy
outcome is limited to a payoﬀ. We obtain the following corollary:
21Corollary 1 An r-individual prefers the uninformative information structure
to any other information structure.
As the uninformative information structure is coarser than any other in-
formation structure, this result is a direct consequence of Proposition 3 and
Proposition 4. The preference, in Corollary 1, can be weak. For example, if Y
denotes an unchosen strategy under the uninformative information structure,
the r-individual is indiﬀerent about the uniformative information structure and
a Y -ﬁner one. A Y -ﬁner information structure improves the feedback context of
strategy Y and decreases the expected r-utility that would have been obtained
from this strategy. However, a Y -ﬁner information structure has no impact on
the expected r-utility of the chosen strategy X. On the contrary, an r-individual
strictly prefers the uninformative information structure to a ﬁner one or even
to an X-ﬁner one8.
5 Regret and information value
In this section, we study the value of a signal S which gives information about
the future realizations of the risky alternatives. After the signal, at the learning
stage, each risky alternative Yn is characterized by a conditional probability
distribution, given the payoﬀ of the chosen strategy x and the observed signals,
sx and s.
We ﬁrst consider the case without ﬂexibility. Information S arrives at the
learning stage, after the choice has been made, and cannot be used to modify the
choice. We then consider the case of ﬂexibility in which information S arrives
at the decision stage, and can be used to modify the choice. In both cases,
information value is computed before the decision stage. Information value is
8Unless there exists a strategy X
′
such that the r-individual is indiﬀerent to X and X
′
under the uninformative information structure. In that case, he can protect himself against
feedback by choosing X
′
.
22positive when the observation of the signal increases the expected r-utility: in
other words, information has positive value when the agent is ready to pay for it.
Under the VNM axioms, information has no value when there is no ﬂexibility,
because it cannot be used to modify the choice. On the contrary, when there
is ﬂexibility, information value is positive as soon as it allows, with a positive
probability, the agent to modify his choice (see, for example, Gollier 2001). In
what follows, we want to see how these results are modiﬁed with an r-utility
function.
5.1 No ﬂexibility
Let us consider an r-individual making his choice in the information structure
background IS = {SX,SY1,...,SYN}. Strategy X denotes his optimal strategy
under IS. Let us now consider a signal S which makes IS X-ﬁner:




WYn, f (y1,...,yN|x,sx,s) = f (y1,...,yN|x,s)
(10)
The agent receives the signal at the learning stage, after the choice has






















When the signal S provides additional information about the unchosen
strategies Y1...YN, Equation (11) shows that, given the values of x and sx,
the reference point ﬂuctuates with the signal. If V (S) denotes the value of
information, we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Under non-ﬂexibility (or when information does not modify the
23optimal choice), V (S) ≤ 0.
Introducing a signal X-reﬁnes the information structure and decreases the
expected r-utility of the regretful individual. Corollary 2 directly results from
Proposition 3.
By adding a new risk to the reference point, the signal decreases the expected
r-utility under RPRA. We have
Ex,s [u(x,rx,sx,s)] ≤ Ex [u(x,rx,sx)] (12)
and thus, under P1a, there exists v ≤ 0 (information value) such that
Ex,s [u(x,rx,sx,s)] = Ex [u(x + v,rx,sx + v)] (13)
Equation (13) means that the r-individual must be paid to accept the infor-
mation. Moreover, under ﬂexibility, when choice X remains optimal whatever
the value taken by the signal, the result still holds. Information increases the
risk on the reference point without allowing any other choice to be made. Corol-
lary 2 contrasts with what is obtained under VNM axioms: information value
is negative for Corollary 2, whereas it is equal to zero under VNM axioms.
In what follows, we continue to assume that there is no ﬂexibility. The choice
cannot be modiﬁed after information is received. However, the choice can be
modiﬁed, before the signal, when the r-individual learns that he will obtain
some information. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Under non-ﬂexibility, it can be optimal for an r-individual to
modify his choice when he learns that he will receive additional information
about some of the foregone strategies.
Proof. See Example 3.
24We now give an example in which an r-individual, who has the choice between
two independent risky alternatives Φ = {X,Y }, chooses strategy X. But, in
this example, learning that he will obtain some information about Y incites him
to change his choice from X to Y , in order to insure himself against the reference
point risk. Under VNM axioms, the fact of receiving information in the future
never modiﬁes the optimal choice. We thus obtain another distinction between
regret behaviour and VNM behaviour. In all the examples given in this paper,
the r-utility function is the multiplicative r-utility function u(x,y) = −e−xe
1
2r.
Example 3 Let us consider a set of two risky alternatives Φ = {X,Y }. The
risky alternative X takes the value 1, and the value 2, with equal probabili-
ties. The risky alternative Y takes the value 0.8, and the value 2.5, with equal
probabilities. We consider an uninformative information structure in which the
r-individual does not observe the realization of the foregone strategy at the learn-
ing stage. We then consider a perfect signal about strategy Y . Our results are






X −0.487 1.438 −0.568 −0.683
Y −0.487 1.438 −0.604 −0.604
* Expected c-utility
** Certainty equivalent computed with the c-utility when there is no signal
† Expected r-utility when there is no signal
‡ Expected r-utility when the individual anticipates the signal
As column † shows, X is the optimal strategy when there is no signal. The
comparison between lines 2 and 3 in column ‡ allows us to conclude that the
introduction of a future signal on Y makes Y more attractive than X. We also
note that, on line 2, the comparison between column † and column ‡ illustrates
Proposition 3. The details of the computation are given in Appendix 2.
25On the theoretical side, this result is close to the underlying mechanism that
explains the conservative behaviour identiﬁed by Krähmer and Stone (2008) in
their two-period approach. The authors consider two strategies generating i.i.d
payoﬀs9 and show that, when the signal contained in a strategy is independent
of the strategy payoﬀs, the individual prefers the less informative strategy (in
the Blackwell sense) in order to minimize his exposure to ex post information.
This result explains why, at the second period, the individual might be tempted
to stick to his ﬁrst period choice in order to ignore what he would have obtained
had he made another decision at the ﬁrst period. We notice that, since past
actions are not modiﬁable, Khrämer and Stone’s individual is in a non-ﬂexibility
situation as regards his ﬁrst period choice.
On the experimental side, our results about regret and information are con-
ﬁrmed by the study of Zeelenberg et al. (1996) which shows that people tend
to avoid having information about foregone alternatives. In their paper, Zee-
lenberg et al. use the term ‘regret aversion’. Together with many others, they
employ ‘regret aversion’ to qualify people who may feel regret: this corresponds
to our P2b. We show here, however, that P2b alone is not suﬃcient to obtain
a result consistent with the experiments of Zeelenberg et al. What is lacking is
P4b, RPRA, which is both necessary and central to our results. Consequently,
even though more empirical facts would be needed to deal fully with this issue,
the study of Zeelenberg et al. can be interpreted as an experimental justiﬁcation
of P4b.
5.2 Flexibility
Let us now consider the case of ﬂexibility, where the signal takes place prior to
the choice being adopted, and the decision can be adapted to the information.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider an uninformative information structure:
9independently and identically distributed payoﬀs.
26a strategy outcome is limited to a payoﬀ. We distinguish two channels through
which the signal aﬀects the expected utility obtained from a strategy:
1. First, the individual revises his beliefs about the probability distributions
of the strategies correlated to the signal, and the expected utilities of these
strategies are then modiﬁed. We call this channel the probability eﬀect.
2. Secondly, the signal can modify the regret that people anticipate feeling
when they choose a strategy. We call this channel the regret eﬀect. For
example, a good signal on strategy Y can decrease the expected r-utility
from strategy X, because choosing X can expose to feeling more regret
than before (the regret of not having chosen Y ). The anticipated regret
associated with the choice of strategy Y can also be modiﬁed. This eﬀect
is speciﬁc to regret theory.
Let us now consider a particular r-individual. Let X denote his optimal
strategy according to the c-utility function criterion. Using the c-utility function
criterion amounts to saying that X is the optimal strategy if we do not take
into account the regret eﬀect. Let us now consider a signal S which has the
particular feature of not modifying his optimal strategy (if the choice were still
made on the basis of the c-utility function). Whatever the value s of the signal
S, X would remain the optimal choice. This can be written as
∀s,∀Yn ∈ Φ,E [u(x,x)|s] ≥ E [u(yn,yn)|s] (14)
Moreover, since the signal does not modify the optimal strategy, the expected
c-utility when the agent anticipates obtaining the signal is equal to his expected
c-utility when there is no signal. As the c-utility function behaves like the VNM
utility function, this is tantamount to saying that we have a signal that would
have no value under VNM axioms.
27Let us assume now that, when there is no signal, X is also the optimal
strategy according to the r-utility function criterion and that
E [u(x,rx)]=E [u(x,x)] (15)
Strategy X is a dominant strategy: choosing X ensures having no regret.
Under an uninformative information structure, this assumption does not nec-
essarily imply that X always oﬀer the highest payoﬀ. What it does signify is
that X is always the ex post best strategy given the r-individual’s information
at the learning stage. When the information structure is uninformative, the
information, at the learning stage, is limited to the observation of the chosen
strategy payoﬀ.
We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 6 With ﬂexibility and an uniformative information structure, if
X is a dominant strategy, and S is information that would have no value under
VNM axioms, then V (S) ≤ 0.
Proof. The proof uses P2b. See Appendix 3.
Let Xs ∈ Φ denote the chosen strategy when the value of the signal is
s, and xs a realization of Xs. Let E [u(xs,rxs,s)] denote the expected r-utility
under ﬂexibility. The above proposition states that E [u(xs,rxs,s)] is lower than
E [u(x,rx)] = E [u(x,x)]. Once again, our result diﬀers from what is obtained
under VNM axioms, where information value cannot be negative. This result
might also seem somewhat surprising, because ﬂexibility allows an individual to
use information in an optimal way. In order to illustrate the above proposition
and understand its underlying mechanisms we give, in what follows, an example
in which the value of information is negative under ﬂexibility assumption. We
should stress that, in this example, the r-individual uses the information. He
28chooses, in an optimal way, his strategy conditionally to the signal value (X is
not always optimal). Although, under VNM axioms, the information would be
of no use, a regretful agent adapts his strategy to the signal. However, despite
its usefulness for a regretful agent, the signal is globally harmful.
Example 4 Let us consider a set of two independent risky alternatives, Φ =
{X,Y }. The risky alternative X takes the value 1, and the value 2, with equal
probabilities. The risky alternative Y takes the value 0.5, and the value 1.4
with equal probabilities. We consider an uninformative information structure
in which the agent does not observe the realization of the foregone alternative
at the learning stage. Column † in the table below shows that strategy X is the
optimal strategy. We then consider a perfect signal on strategy Y . The agent
receives the signal at the decision stage and uses it to determine his best choice.





X −0.487 1.438 −0.487
Y −0.638 0.900 −0.876
E [u(zs,rzs,s)]
−0.497







and (ii) without signal E [u(x,rx)] shows that, in this example, information
value is negative, even if there is ﬂexibility. Without the signal, X is the optimal
choice. The agent, when he chooses X, does not expect to feel regret because X
is always higher than the certainty equivalent of Y . As strategy X is a dominant
strategy, the expected r-utility is equal to the expected c-utility: −0.487.
Now when the agent receives a perfect signal on Y , computation establishes
that strategy X remains optimal when Y = 0.5. The agent still does not feel
any regret and his expected r-utility is the same as before, that is to say −0.487.
Thus, everything depends on what happens when Y = 1.4. When the agent
learns that Y = 1.4, choosing X can now expose him to some regret because X
29can be lower than Y . This is the regret eﬀect of the signal. Even if the signal
is about strategy Y , it aﬀects the expected r-utility obtained from strategy X.
We ﬁnd that the expected r-utility from choosing X decreases, and computation
gives Y as the optimal choice. However, we ﬁnd that the r-utility from choosing
Y = 1.4 is equal to −0.506, which is lower than −0.487. This means that,
if the expected r-utility obtained from X had not decreased, Y would not have
become optimal. The probability eﬀect of the signal is not suﬃcient, in itself,
to make Y optimal. The strength of regret eﬀect explains why the r-individual
switches from strategy X to strategy Y , while the weakness of the probability
eﬀect explains why this switching results in a decrease of the utility.
To summarize: when Y = 0.5, strategy X remains optimal, and the level of
utility is the same as before (when the agent does not receive the signal). When
Y = 1.4, strategy Y becomes optimal, but the level of utility is lower than before.
On average, the expected r-utility when the agent anticipates obtaining the signal
is equal to 1
2 (−0.487) + 1
2 (−0.506) = −0.497 < −0.487. We conclude that,
under ﬂexibility, the expected r-utility of the agent, who anticipates receiving
a perfect signal on Y , is lower than his expected r-utility without information.
The information value is negative. The details of the computation are given in
Appendix 4.
The above example allows us to make a comment about our modeling of
regret. When the signal gives Y = 1.4, the r-utility obtained from choosing Y
is written as follows (see Appendix 4):
E [u(y,ry,s)|s] = −e−1.4e
1.438
2 = −0.506 (16)
Since Y = 1.4 is lower than ECX = 1.438, the reference point, in the
expression of the r-utility, is equal to ECX. At ﬁrst sight, a reference point
higher than Y expresses regret. The r-utility obtained from choosing Y is lower
30than the c-utility from choosing Y . But we know that strategy Y is riskless
(Y is equal to 1.4), and cannot generate some regret, when the outcome of the
foregone strategy is not observable. When the r-individual chooses Y , he knows
the exact value of Y . Moreover, he learns nothing new at the learning stage.
Thus, there is no reason to feel any regret at having chosen Y . The r-utility
is lower than the c-utility for another reason: choosing is painful because it
implies giving up some opportunities. When there is no possibility of choice,
the r-utility is equal to the c-utility. This level of utility represents the pure
satisfaction of receiving a gain equal to 1.4. But, when an r-individual has the
choice between Y = 1.4 and strategy X, even if he chooses Y , his r-utility is lower
because he knows that he might have obtained a higher payoﬀ with strategy X.
The reference point here does not reﬂect a feeling of regret, but illustrates the
fact that receiving Y = 1.4, or choosing Y = 1.4, does not generate the same
satisfaction. In order to clarify this point, let us take a simple example. Imagine
that we receive 100€. Obviously, we are happy about that. Now, imagine that
we have the choice between receiving 100€ and playing in a lottery where we
can earn 1000€ or nothing. If we choose to receive 100€ we are happy, but our
level of satisfaction is lower than before because we know that we might, if we
had chosen the lottery, have earned 1000€.
6 Conclusion
Using the utility function proposed by Quiguin (1994), we have proposed a
general model of regretful preferences and confronted the usual regret utility
functions to this model. We have highlighted some characteristics that these
utility functions require in order to be in conformity with our preferences model.
Moreover, we have emphasized that information is a key concept in regret the-
ory, and have developed a model of regret which accomodates any information
31structure. Using the criterion of Blackwell (1951), we have classiﬁed the in-
formation structures according to a regretful individual’s preferences. We have
shown that he prefers a coarser information structure to a ﬁner one. Our frame-
work has also served as a basis for studying the concept of information value
when agents are regretful. We have shown that information value is always neg-
ative when there is no ﬂexibility. We have also shown that information value
can be negative under ﬂexibility.
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a random variable which
ﬂuctuates with Sx when x is given.


































































































































































































































Let us put this result aside and come back to it later.




































































































































If X denotes the optimal strategy under IS1, we have shown here that
switching from IS1 to IS2 decreases the expected r-utility that the r-individual
obtains from strategy X. Moreover, even if choosing another strategy becomes
optimal for him, this will not let him have the same expected utility as under
IS1. If X denotes the optimal strategy under IS2, we have shown here that
switching from IS2 to IS1 increases the expected r-utility that the r-individual
obtains from strategy X. In both cases, the r-individual prefers IS1 to IS2.
The proof of Proposition 4 is identical. IS2 being ﬁner than IS1, we have







































The maximum expected utility that any r-individual can reach under IS2 is
lower than under IS1.
Appendix 2
First, we compute the expected c-utilities of X and Y :


















From that, we can easily compute that ECX = 1.438140393 and ECY =
1.47456422.
The expected r-utilities under imperfect information are






















Under imperfect information, the agent prefers strategy X.
Let us now consider the situation in which the agent obtains a perfect signal
on Y at the learning stage. At the learning stage, the agent knows both the
realization of X and the realization of Y . Thus, for each couple of values (x,y),
the reference point is rx,s = Max(x,y) and the expected r-utility from choosing
X becomes
















The expected r-utility from choosing Y is unchanged since there is no signal
on X:
E [u(y,ry,s)] = −0.604381613 (33)
We thus have E [u(x,rx,s)] < E [u(y,ry,s)]. Anticipating the signal on strat-
egy Y , the agent changes his strategy from X to Y in order to insure himself
against the risk on the reference point generated by the signal.
38Appendix 3
We should recall that X denotes the optimal strategy when there is no signal.
Moreover, we assume that X does not generate ex post regret (See Equation
15). We also assume that, without the regret eﬀect, X would remain the optimal
strategy whatever the signal value (See Equation 14).
Let us now consider a regretful individual. Let   denote the set in which
signal S takes its value. Let  1 ⊂   denote the subset containing the value of
S such that X remains optimal (∀s ∈  1, Xs = X).
Since rx,s ≥ x, P2b implies that
E [u(x,rx,s)|s] ≤ E [u(x,x)|s] (34)
We thus have
∀s ∈  1,E [u(xs,rxs,s)|s] ≤ E [u(x,x)|s] (35)
Let  2 ⊂   denote the subset containing the value of S such that X is no
longer optimal. Let Yns denote the optimal startegy (∀s ∈  2, Xs = Yns).
Since ryns,s ≥ yns, P2b implies that
E [u(yns,ryns,s)|s] ≤ E [u(yns,yns)|s] (36)
The above equation and Equation (14) imply that
∀s ∈  2,E [u(xs,rxs,s)|s] ≤ E [u(x,x)|s] (37)
Equations (35) and (37) imply that
∀s ∈  ,E [u(xs,rxs,s)|s] ≤ E [u(x,x)|s] (38)
39Thus
E [u(xs,rxs,s)] ≤ E [u(x,x)] (39)
The expected r-utility, when the agent anticipates the signal, is lower than
his expected r-utility without the signal. Thus, under P1a, there exists v ≤ 0
such that
E [u(xs,rxs,s)] = E [u(x + v,x + v)] (40)
The information value is negative.
Appendix 4
First, we compute the expected c-utilities and certainty equivalents of X and
Y :





2 + e− 2
2
￿
= −0.487205 and ECX = 1.4381404 (41)








= −0.637693 and ECY = 0.8997964 (42)
The expected r-utilities when there is no signal are






















40As can be seen, whatever the value of Y , the agent feels some regret be-
cause Y is always lower than ECX. On the contrary, the agent does not feel
regret with strategy X. Lottery X is chosen under imperfect information, since
E [u(x,rx)] > E [u(y,ry)].
Let us assume that, at the decision stage, the agent receives a perfect signal
on strategy Y . He chooses strategy Xs, which maximizes his expected r-utility,
given the value of the signal.
When the agent learns that y = 0.5, the expected r-utilities become











E [u(y,ry,s)|s] = −e−0.5e
1.4381404
2 = −1.2449187 (46)
Thus, when y = 0.5, Xs = X.
When the agent learns that y = 1.4, the expected r-utilities become











E [u(y,ry,s)|s] = −e−1.4e
1.4381404
2 = −0.5061461 (48)
Thus, when y = 1.4, Xs = Y . Learning that y = 1.4 increases utility
obtained from strategy Y , and decreases utility obtained from strategy X (when
x = 1, the agent feels regret because x < 1.4).




[−0.487205 − 0.5061461] = −0.4966755 < E [u(x,rx)]
(49)
Under ﬂexibility, the expected r-utility when the agent anticipates perfect
information about Y is lower than when he anticipates not having information
41about Y . The information value is, therefore, negative.
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